Emission-reduction cooperation among technologically complementary manufacturers under a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism with price competition

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:Game-theoretic modeling of cooperative emission reduction under carbon pricing with price competition offers methodological insights for further studies.

🏢実務担当者:Manufacturing firms can use the findings to evaluate collaboration strategies under carbon cap-and-trade, especially the role of technological compatibility and carbon price levels.

🏛政策担当者:The limited effect of initial allowance allocation suggests policy focus should be on carbon price levels and supporting technological conversion capabilities.

近年、排出削減目標に後押しされ、類似製品を生産する製造業者の数が増加し、市場で競争しながらも排出削減協力を求めることを余儀なくされており、この現象は近年の研究でますます注目を集めている。本研究は、炭素排出権の上限・取引メカニズムに基づき、非協力・協力のバイフォームゲームモデルを構築し、価格競争下において技術的に補完的な製造業者が排出削減協力を行う際の最適意思決定を検討する。このモデルは特性関数を用いて提携利益を記述し、シャープレイ値による利益配分を適用する一方、均衡結果は非協力ゲーム分析を通じて導出される。研究結果は、高い炭素排出削減投資係数が製造業者の炭素削減発展水準を抑制し、その利益を減少させることを示している。炭素排出権の上限・取引メカニズムがなければ、競争する製造業者には技術協力へのインセンティブが欠如する。炭素取引価格の上昇は排出削減と利益成長を有意に促進する一方、政府が配分する初期炭素許容量の効果は限定的なままである。さらに、製造業者の技術転換能力の向上は、価格競争下における炭素削減発展水準を改善し、収益性を高めることができる。全体として、本研究は、炭素排出権取引メカニズム下における競争企業の協力的排出削減に対して、理論的かつ実践的な指針を提供するものである。

AI 翻訳（deepseek-v4-flash）。 正確を期す場合は下の原文を参照してください。

In recent years, driven by emission reduction targets, an increasing number of manufacturers producing similar products have been compelled to seek emission reduction cooperation even while competing in the market, a phenomenon that has attracted growing attention in recent studies. Based on the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, this study develops a noncooperative–cooperative biform game model to examine the optimal decisions of technologically complementary manufacturers engaging in emission reduction cooperation under price competition. The model describes alliance profits using a characteristic function and applies the Shapley value for profit allocation, while equilibrium outcomes are derived through noncooperative game analysis. The research results show that the high carbon emission reduction investment coefficient will inhibit the carbon abatement development level of manufacturers and reduce their profits. Without a carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, competitive manufacturers lack incentives for technological collaboration. An increase in carbon trading prices significantly promotes emission reductions and profit growth, whereas the effect of government-allocated initial carbon allowances remains limited. Moreover, the improvement of manufacturers’ technological conversion capability can improve the level of carbon abatement development and enhance their profitability under price competition. In general, this study provides theoretical and practical guidance for the cooperative emission reduction of competitive enterprises under the carbon emission rights trading mechanism.

• semanticscholar https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0345856&type=printablefirst seen 2026-05-15 17:23:25 · last seen 2026-08-12 05:16:28