Optimal financing and carbon emission reduction strategies under cap-and-trade and reward-penalty policies
キャップ・アンド・トレードと報奨・罰則政策下での最適な資金調達と炭素排出削減戦略 (AI 翻訳)
Peng Ma, Chen Li, 龚业明, Henry Xu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、資金制約のある再製造業者を含むアウトソーシング再製造サプライチェーンにおいて、キャップ・アンド・トレードと報奨・罰則政策の下での最適な生産・排出削減・資金調達戦略を分析する。銀行融資とトレードクレジットの比較、およびOEM・UR単独・共同削減の3つのアプローチを検討し、共同削減が最も高い販売量と最も低い小売価格をもたらすことを示す。また、報奨・罰則の強化や炭素価格の上昇が資金調達ニーズを高め、OEMがトレードクレジットを提供する動機を強めることを明らかにする。
English
This study analyzes optimal production, emission reduction, and financing strategies in an outsourcing remanufacturing supply chain with a capital-constrained remanufacturer under cap-and-trade and reward-penalty policies. Comparing bank loans and trade credit, and OEM-only, UR-only, and joint reduction approaches, it finds joint reduction yields highest sales and lowest prices. Stronger reward-penalty incentives and higher carbon prices amplify financing needs, strengthening OEMs' motivation to provide trade credit.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではカーボンプライシング導入が進む中、サプライチェーン全体での排出削減と資金調達の連携は、中小企業を含む再製造業者の資金制約に対応する政策設計に示唆を与える。SSBJ開示やScope 3対応を踏まえた取引先支援の在り方にも関連する。
In the global GX context
Globally, this contributes to the literature on carbon pricing and supply chain finance, offering insights for designing reward-penalty mechanisms and trade credit arrangements that support emission reduction in capital-constrained supply chains, relevant to policy frameworks like the EU ETS and emerging carbon markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic model linking carbon policy, financing, and remanufacturing strategies, useful for extending supply chain sustainability research.
🏢実務担当者:Offers guidance on choosing between bank loans and trade credit for financing emission reduction projects, and on structuring joint reduction initiatives with partners.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights how reward-penalty intensity and carbon prices influence firms' financing and reduction choices, informing the calibration of policy instruments.
📄 Abstract（原文）
With the implementation of low-carbon policies, responsible firms have adopted remanufacturing or invested in green technologies to reduce emissions. The sustainability actions, i.e., remanufacturing and investment in green technologies, are significantly influenced by national policies and financial constraints. This study explores optimal production and carbon reduction strategies, as well as financing preferences, in an outsourcing remanufacturing supply chain involving a well-capitalized original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a capital-constrained outsourced remanufacturer (UR) under cap-trade and reward-penalty policies. We compare three emission reduction approaches – OEM-only, UR-only, and joint emission reduction under two financing options: bank loans and trade credit. Our results show that: (1) The joint emission abatement model generates the highest sales quantities but the lowest retail prices for new and remanufactured products. (2) As the reward-penalty intensities increase, OEMs’ strategies shift from UR-only to joint emission reduction, while URs’ strategies shift from OEM-only to joint emission reduction. (3) When URs face severe capital shortages, OEMs tend to provide trade credit regardless of interest rates, while URs with moderate capital choose between bank and trade credit depending on financing rates. Stronger reward-penalty incentives and higher carbon prices amplify financing needs and further strengthen OEMs’ motivation to support URs through trade credit.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2026.2702044first seen 2026-08-16 04:55:45
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