ブロックチェーンと自主的炭素市場下における再製造の最適化：R&Dインセンティブとサプライチェーン調整
Optimizing Remanufacturing under Blockchain and Voluntary Carbon Markets: R&D Incentives and Supply Chain Coordination (原題)
M. Mubashir Unnissa, Shanmuga Sundari G, P. Jalapathy, Prabu D, Bharathy S
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
ブロックチェーンと自主的排出削減市場（VERM）が再製造サプライチェーンの意思決定・環境性能・調整機構に与える影響をゲーム理論で分析。VERMは再製造量を増やし双方に利益をもたらすが、ガバナンス設計や投資額、炭素クレジット収益配分に依存する。炭素価格上昇が必ずしも排出削減につながらず、過剰インセンティブが過剰再製造を招く可能性を示す。コスト分担と二部料金契約による調整機構を提案する。
English
A game-theoretic model examines how blockchain and voluntary emission reduction markets (VERM) affect remanufacturing supply chain decisions, environmental performance, and coordination. VERM can boost remanufacturing output and benefit both parties, but outcomes hinge on governance setup, investment levels, and carbon-credit revenue sharing. Counterintuitively, higher VER prices do not necessarily cut emissions, and excessive incentives may cause over-remanufacturing. Cost-sharing and two-part tariff contracts are proposed to coordinate decentralized decision-makers.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
ブロックチェーンによるデジタル認証と炭素クレジットを組み合わせた再製造モデルは、Scope 3排出管理やサーキュラーエコノミーと炭素市場の接続を検討する日本企業にとって示唆的。SSBJ開示やサプライチェーン排出削減目標の設計に応用可能。
In the global GX context
This work connects blockchain-enabled digital certification with voluntary carbon markets and supply-chain contracting, relevant to ISSB/Scope 3 disclosure and circular-economy transition finance debates. It cautions that carbon-credit incentives can misfire without careful contract design, informing how firms structure supplier decarbonization incentives.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:炭素市場とサプライチェーン契約設計を統合したゲーム理論モデルとして、再製造・循環経済研究の理論的枠組みを提供する。
🏢実務担当者:炭素クレジット収益配分と契約設計が再製造の経済性・排出削減に与える影響を理解し、サプライヤー連携の設計に活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:自主的炭素市場のインセンティブ設計が過剰再製造や非効率を招く可能性を踏まえ、炭素価格制度の設計に注意を促す。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract This paper explores the effect of blockchain technology and voluntary emission reduction markets (VERM) on the remanufacturing supply chain decision, environmental performance, and coordination mechanism. Using a game-theoretic model of a new product manufacturer and an independent remanufacturer, we examine outsourcing and authorization with VERM and analyze the impacts of different research and development leadership types and a coordination mechanism using cost-sharing and two-part tariff contracts. Our results show that while VERM can boost remanufacturing output and benefit both sides, the outcomes really depend on things like governance setup, how much is spent on investments, and how carbon credit revenue is split. In this case, an outsourced remanufacturer can have a higher output than an authorized one and achieve a higher emission reduction effort per unit remanufactured product than an authorized one, but neither has a dominant advantage: consumer acceptance and VER prices may be threshold-dependent factors affecting corporate profits and emission reductions. Counterintuitively, higher VER prices do not necessarily reduce overall emissions, and excessive incentives may lead to off-target over-remanufacturing when remanufacturing is more carbon-intensive. The proposed coordination contracts coordinate the incentives of two decentralized decision makers towards the center target when the decision conditions (the feasibility constraints and the participation constraints) are fulfilled. The results may be used to shed light on links between blockchain-enabled digital certification, carbon credit incentives, and contractual design for reducing economic and environmental costs.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11532004/v1first seen 2026-11-13 05:12:35 · last seen 2026-11-14 05:07:11
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