Climate Policy for Coordination
調整のための気候政策 (AI 翻訳)
Inge van den Bijgaart, Åsa Löfgren
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
基礎素材産業の脱炭素化には、下流企業の技術導入と上流企業の投入材供給の協調投資が必要です。本論文は間接ネットワーク効果をモデル化し、無投資均衡と協調均衡が存在することを示します。炭素価格や無差別補助金では過剰達成なしに調整失敗を解消できず、コスト閾値以下の企業への補助金が最適な協調均衡を実現します。低コスト企業を除外することで補助対象を縮小でき、不完全な観測下でも有効です。
English
Decarbonizing basic materials requires coordinated investment between downstream adopters and upstream suppliers. This paper models indirect network effects creating a no-investment and a coordinated equilibrium. Carbon pricing and non-discriminatory subsidies cannot resolve the failure without overshooting; targeted subsidies to firms below a cost threshold implement the optimal equilibrium. Excluding lowest-cost firms shrinks the subsidized group, and targeting remains effective under imperfect observability.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本のGX政策では、鉄鋼・化学などの基礎素材産業の脱炭素化が課題であり、本論文の理論は産業政策の設計に示唆を与えます。特に、GX推進法や構造転換支援の枠組みで、対象企業の選定や補助金の設計に役立つ可能性があります。
In the global GX context
This paper provides formal support for targeted industrial policy in decarbonizing basic materials, relevant to global discussions on carbon pricing and subsidies. It informs policy design under the EU's CBAM and national industrial strategies, highlighting the need for coordination mechanisms beyond carbon pricing.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a theoretical model of coordination failures in industrial decarbonization and the optimal design of targeted subsidies.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights for companies in basic materials industries on how policy incentives may shape investment coordination.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the limitations of carbon pricing alone and the rationale for targeted subsidies to achieve coordinated decarbonization.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Decarbonizing basic materials industries requires coordinated investment between downstream firms adopting abatement technologies and upstream input providers. We model the resulting indirect network effects, which generate a no-investment equilibrium alongside a coordinated one. Carbon pricing and non-discriminatory subsidies cannot resolve this coordination failure without overshooting the optimum. Subsidies targeted at firms below a cost threshold implement the optimal coordinated equilibrium without distortion. We further show that excluding the lowest-cost firms, who invest voluntarily once others lead, shrinks the subsidized group, and that targeting remains effective under imperfect observability and imprecise targeting. Our results provide formal support for targeted industrial policy.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.65864/e653xdswllfirst seen 2026-08-16 06:04:25
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