進化ゲーム理論に基づく電力システムの低炭素移行戦略
Low carbon transition strategy of power system based on evolutionary game theory (原題)
Yiming Ke, Yuanzheng Ke, Jinsong Wu, F Liu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、発電企業・電力消費者・政府の三者による動的進化ゲームモデルを構築し、新エネ発電の偏差評価、グリーン電力消費比率、エネルギー取引、炭素取引、政府補助金規制を統合的に考慮した。数値シミュレーションにより、発電企業の新エネ開発意欲は初期意欲と業界動向に主に依存し政府介入の影響は小さいこと、消費者の設備更新意欲は自らの環境意識に依存すること、政府介入意欲は消費者意欲に大きく影響され、消費者意欲の上昇が政府撤退と市場自律を加速することを示した。省エネ補助金、差別化規制、グリーン電力政策の最適化を提案する。
English
This study builds a dynamic evolutionary game model of enterprises, consumers, and government, integrating new-energy generation deviation, green electricity share, energy and carbon trading, and subsidy regulation. Simulations show that generators' new-energy willingness depends mainly on initial intent and industry trends rather than government intervention, consumers' equipment-upgrade willingness relies on their own green awareness, and rising consumer willingness accelerates government withdrawal and market autonomy. It proposes energy-saving subsidies, differentiated regulation, and green power policy optimization.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
中国の電力システム低炭素移行を進化ゲームで分析した研究。日本では電力システム改革やGXリーグ、非化石証書・グリーン電力市場の設計を考える上で、政府・企業・消費者の動学をモデル化する視点が参考になる。
In the global GX context
This paper models the dynamic interplay of government, generators, and consumers in China's power-sector decarbonization. It contributes to global transition-finance and carbon-pricing scholarship by showing how consumer green awareness can reduce the need for sustained government intervention, relevant to TCFD/ISSB-aligned policy design in emerging markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:進化ゲーム理論を電力低炭素移行の政策設計に応用する手法と、三者間の動学メカニズムの知見を提供する。
🏢実務担当者:電力・エネルギー企業が新エネ投資やグリーン電力調達の意思決定を行う際、政府補助金や炭素取引の影響を定性的に理解する助けとなる。
🏛政策担当者:省エネ補助金や差別化規制、グリーン電力政策の設計において、消費者意識の向上が政府介入の必要性を減らし市場自律を促す点を考慮すべき。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract Driven by the target of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, the low-carbon transition of the power system is steadily advancing. However, the current level of refinement in modeling the revenue functions of multiple entities such as power generation companies, electricity consumers, and governments is insufficient, resulting in unclear dynamic evolution paths and policy designs. Therefore, this study comprehensively considers multiple key factors, including the assessment of deviations in new energy generation, the proportion of green electricity consumption, energy trading, carbon trading, and government subsidy regulation. On this basis, it innovatively constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model of enterprise–consumer–government. Through dynamic parameter calibration and numerical simulation analysis, it is found that: firstly, the willingness of power generation enterprises to develop new energy is mainly determined by their initial willingness and industry trends, and is less affected by government intervention. Secondly, the willingness of power consumers to update their equipment mainly relies on their own green awareness, and is limited by policies and other factors. Thirdly, the willingness of government intervention is significantly influenced by the willingness of electricity consumers, and an increase in consumer willingness can accelerate government withdrawal and promote market autonomy. Therefore, strategies such as energy-saving subsidies, differentiated regulation, and optimization of green power policies are proposed.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1186/s40807-026-00276-1first seen 2026-09-28 05:19:27
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