Construction 5.0における低炭素・デジタル変革に向けたグリーンインテリジェント建築技術の協調イノベーションのためのインセンティブと抑制メカニズム

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:進化ゲーム理論を用いた政策インセンティブ設計の応用例として、建設業GXの協調ガバナンス研究に参考となる。

🏢実務担当者:建設企業のGX担当者は、政府補助金や税制優遇の閾値設計を理解し、協調イノベーション戦略の立案に活用できる。

🏛政策担当者:補助金の臨界閾値や差別化インセンティブの設計は、建設業の低炭素移行を促す政策立案に示唆を与える。

Against the dual backdrop of the “dual carbon” goals and the digital transformation of the construction enterprises (CEs), green intelligent building technologies (GIBTs) have become the core driving force for improving quality and efficiency in the CEs and achieving low-carbon, sustainable development. Taking the collaborative innovation and development of GIBTs as the research context, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving three players (TPs), the government, CEs, and academic and research institutions (ARIs), to systematically analyze the evolution-stable strategies of the collaborative innovation system for GIBTs and their underlying mechanisms. The research findings indicate: (1) Government subsidy funds for collaborative innovation directed at both CEs and ARIs have distinct critical thresholds; the subsidy amount directly determines whether the system can converge to the ideal equilibrium of comprehensive three-player collaboration (participation, collaboration, collaboration). (2) The incentive effects of green incentives on the two types of innovation entities, CEs and ARIs, exhibit significant heterogeneity. Green incentives for CEs are highly sensitive core control parameters, while those for ARIs are weakly sensitive auxiliary parameters. (3) The cost-sharing ratios for research and development (R&D) between CEs and ARIs affect, respectively, the equilibrium level of the TPs collaboration and the stability of the system’s dynamic convergence. Relying solely on internal cost-sharing mechanisms between these two groups cannot achieve deep collaboration among TPs; it must be complemented by collaborative external policy adjustments such as government subsidy funds and green incentives. Such deep collaboration among TPs emphasizes the substantive enhancement of coordination efficiency and cooperative quality on the basis of full participation, reflecting the maturity and effectiveness of three-player innovation interaction. (4) Default penalties and the returns from CEs’ independent R&D constitute, respectively, the rigid constraint mechanism and the market-driven mechanism for collaborative innovation in GIBTs. Working in tandem, one exerting a restraining effect and the other a stimulating effect, they jointly regulate the cooperative behavior of CEs and ARIs, thereby resolving the dilemma of insufficient motivation for collaborative innovation in GIBTs. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study employs evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods to refine theories related to policy thresholds, differentiated incentives, collaborative governance, and the balance of benefits and risks among industry, ARIs. It also demonstrates that the underlying logic can serve as a reference for developing countries with similar industrial structures. In terms of practical contributions, this study recommends establishing subsidy allocation standards based on subsidy critical thresholds; implementing differentiated tax incentives for CEs, ARIs; scientifically designing R&D cost-sharing ratios; and improving mechanisms for penalty-based enforcement and incentives for independent R&D. Furthermore, it proposes advancing institutional development, policy implementation, and system optimization in a progressive manner, short-term, medium-term, and long-term, according to priority.

• openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su18199833first seen 2026-09-27 04:41:20