アンモニア混焼と閉ループ炭素責任フィードバックを統合したエネルギーシステムのStackelberg型運用
Stackelberg Dispatch of an Integrated Energy System with Ammonia Co-Firing and Closed-Loop Carbon Responsibility Feedback (原題)
Zihan Zhang, Longfei Li, Yuchen Jia
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
石炭火力へのアンモニア混焼・CCS・P2A・吸収式冷凍を統合したエネルギーシステムの低炭素経済運用モデルを構築。運用者と需要家の間のStackelbergゲームに炭素責任の閉ループを組み込み、動的な責任移転と需要応答を考慮する。NSWOAとGurobiの二層解法により、共同運用で運用者目的が約15%改善、炭素排出約5%削減、一次エネルギー10%以上削減を達成。
English
This study builds a low-carbon economic dispatch model for an integrated energy system combining coal-fired units, ammonia co-firing, CCS, power-to-ammonia, and absorption cooling. A multi-objective Stackelberg game embeds a closed-loop carbon responsibility mechanism linking operator and users via price signals and demand response. Joint operation improves the operator objective by ~15%, cuts carbon emissions ~5%, and reduces primary energy use by over 10%.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
アンモニア混焼は日本のGX政策（火力脱炭素・水素/アンモニア供給網）と直結する技術領域。炭素責任を需要家の価格シグナルに変換する枠組みは、SSBJのScope3開示やカーボンプライシング設計を検討する日本企業・政策当局にとって示唆が大きい。
In the global GX context
Ammonia co-firing and CCS integration are central to Japan's and Asia's thermal decarbonization pathways. The closed-loop carbon responsibility mechanism, which translates emissions into user-side price signals, offers a modeling template relevant to Scope 3 allocation debates and internal carbon pricing under ISSB/CSRD disclosure regimes.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:炭素責任の閉ループ設計とStackelbergゲームによる需給協調の定式化が、低炭素運用研究の参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:アンモニア混焼・CCS導入時の運用コストと炭素コストを需要家へ配分する設計に活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:炭素責任を価格シグナル化する仕組みは、カーボンプライシングやScope3配分政策の設計に示唆を与える。
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study addresses coal-fired unit retrofitting, multi-energy carbon responsibility tracing, and operator–user interdependence in low-carbon economic dispatch of integrated energy systems. A model integrates a coal-fired power plant (CFPP), carbon capture system (CCS), power-to-ammonia (P2A), and combined cooling unit (ACC). It covers ammonia production, storage and co-firing, cooling using residual energy, and CO2 capture, utilization and storage. A multi-objective Stackelberg game between the operator and aggregated users embeds a carbon responsibility closed loop, incorporating dynamic responsibility transfer, internal user carbon settlement, and integrated demand response. Electricity and gas loads respond to energy prices and additional carbon costs through price elasticity. User cost optimization shifts and curtails heating and cooling loads. A bilevel interactive method combines the non-dominated sorting whale optimization algorithm (NSWOA) and Gurobi with blockwise carbon coordination and strict closed-loop verification. The technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) selects a representative solution. Under the specified typical-day conditions, the scenario comparisons show that joint operation improves the operator’s objective by approximately 15%, reduces system carbon emissions by approximately 5%, and lowers primary energy consumption by over 10%. Carbon responsibility feedback further reduces emissions, primary energy consumption, and user costs in this case study. The model translates responsibility into user-side price signals and coordinates operator–user decisions.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/en19194682first seen 2026-10-07 05:08:30
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。