AGENCY CONFLICT, ESG DISCLOSURE, AND EBITDA VOLATILITY IN INDONESIAN FAMILY SMEs: THE MODERATING ROLE OF DIRECTOR COMPETENCY AND GENERATIONAL SUCCESSION
インドネシアの家族経営中小企業におけるエージェンシーコンフリクト、ESG開示、EBITDAボラティリティ：取締役の能力と世代交代の調整効果 (AI 翻訳)
Yuni Utami, Riffa'i Al hakim, Dewi Indriasih, Yanti Puji Astuti
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、インドネシアの家族経営中小企業42社を対象に、エージェンシーコンフリクトとESG開示が収益変動に与える影響を分析。ESG開示は取締役の能力を考慮するとEBITDAボラティリティを有意に低下させるが、能力の高い取締役は資源集約的なサステナビリティ投資を行うため、逆に変動を増加させる「サステナビリティ投資パラドックス」を発見。取締役能力スコア（DCS）を実務的なベンチマークとして提案。
English
This study analyzes 42 family SMEs in Indonesia to examine the impact of agency conflict and ESG disclosure on earnings volatility. ESG disclosure significantly reduces EBITDA volatility when director competency is considered, but a sustainability investment paradox emerges where competent boards undertake resource-intensive sustainability commitments, increasing volatility. The study proposes a Director Competency Score (DCS) as a practical benchmarking tool.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
インドネシアの中小企業におけるESG開示と企業統治の関係を示す実証研究。日本ではSSBJ開示義務化が中小企業にも波及する可能性があり、取締役の能力がESG開示の効果を左右する点は、日本の中小企業のガバナンス強化に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global ESG disclosure scholarship by examining the moderating role of director competency in family SMEs, a segment often overlooked. The sustainability investment paradox highlights the need for capacity-building in corporate governance to realize the benefits of ESG disclosure, relevant for ISSB and CSRD implementation in emerging markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides empirical evidence on ESG disclosure and earnings volatility in family SMEs, with a novel moderating variable (director competency).
🏢実務担当者:Offers a practical Director Competency Score (DCS) for benchmarking and improving governance to enhance ESG disclosure effectiveness.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests that regulators like OJK can use DCS to promote better governance and ESG practices among SMEs.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines the effect of agency conflict and ESG disclosure on earnings instability in family-controlled SMEs. Agency conflict is operationalized through residual cash flow (RCF) and ownership concentration. The sample consists of 42 family SMEs listed on the IDX Development and Acceleration Boards, yielding 252 firm-year observations from 2019 to 2024. Grounded in Agency Theory and Upper Echelon Theory, this research applies Moderated Regression Analysis with random effects and a one-period lagged specification to address reverse causality. Director competency and generational succession serve as moderating variables. The Director Competency Score (DCS) is constructed as a composite index of education, board tenure, and professional certifications, with strong inter-rater reliability (κ > 0.80). The empirical results demonstrate that ESG disclosure significantly reduces EBITDA volatility (β=−0.431, p=0.021) when board competency is accounted for. Furthermore, director competency directly lowers earnings volatility (β=−0.164, p=0.055) and negatively moderates the impact of excess cash flow (β=−0.016, p=0.016). Otherwise, the interaction between ESG and DCS positively affects earnings fluctuations (β=+0.218, p=0.056), indicating a sustainability investment paradox where competent boards undertake resource-intensive sustainability commitments. Generational succession does not exhibit a significant moderating effect, primarily due to the sample's uniform first-generation composition. So that, this study proposes the DCS as a practical benchmarking tool for regulators such as OJK and Kementerian Koperasi, offering implications for SDG 8 and SDG 17.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.32424/icsema.v2i1.930first seen 2026-08-14 05:06:22
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。